INTRODUCTION
Section 4B of the Clayton Act provides a four-year statute of limitation for all civil antitrust actions brought under the Act. 1 The doctrine of fraudulent concealment, however, allows courts to toll this statute of limitation when the defendant conceals the acts giving rise to the cause of action. This doctrine prevents wrongdoers from unfairly using statutes of limitation to escape sanction.
Although the judiciary originally created this exception for fraud actions, 2 the Supreme Court later expanded the doctrine to be "read into every federal statute of limitation." 3 In antitrust cases, courts have required that the plaintiff plead and prove three elements in order to toll the statute of limitation: (1) the defendant concealed the conduct that constitutes the cause of action; (2) the defendant's concealment prevented the plaintiff from discovering the cause of action; and (3) the plaintiff exercised due diligence in attempting to discover the cause of action. 4 Application of the first element, the concealment requirement, has created uncertainty and division among the courts. 5 Specifically, the courts disagree as to whether the plaintiff must show that the defendant concealed the wrong with affirmative acts beyond those necessary to create an antitrust violation, or whether it is sufficient for the plaintiff to show that the defendant committed a "selfconcealing" wrong. 6 1. Clayton Act § 4B, 15 U.S.C § 15b (1988) . Section 4B states: "Any action to enforce any cause of action under sections 15, 15a or 15c of this title shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued." Section 15 provides a private civil cause of action for violations of all federal antitrust laws; section 15a provides the federal government with a civil cause of action; and section 15c provides state attorneys general with a civil cause of action.
Although a part of the Clayton Act, the four-year statute of limitation governs violations of all "antitrust laws," which include the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 12-27 (1988), the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 1-7 (1988), and the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 8-11 (1988) 
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This Note argues that courts should apply a self-concealment standard to section 4B of the Clayton Act rather than require a showing of additional affirmative acts. Part I examines the history of the fraudulent concealment doctrine and its application to antitrust cases. It identifies three different standards used by courts to satisfy the concealment element and finds that courts apply the doctrine inconsistently. Part II analyzes the relationship between the fraudulent concealment doctrine and the self-concealment standard in antitrust cases by examining the judicial development of the doctrine and Congress' intent in enacting section 4B. Part II concludes that the selfconcealment standard is an integral part of the fraudulent co.ncealment doctrine and thus should apply to section 4B cases. Part III addresses the policies behind statutes of limitation generally and section 4B specifically, and finds that the self-concealment standard best achieves these policy goals. This Note concludes that courts should toll the antitrust limitation period when the defendant either has affirmatively concealed his wrong or has committed a wrong that inherently conceals itself.
I. FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT AND THE CLAYTON ACT
This Part reviews the evolution of the fraudulent concealment doctrine, evaluates the courts' application of the doctrine to the antitrust laws, and examines the disagreement among the courts on how to apply the doctrine. Section I.A analyzes the history, language, and purpose of section 4B of the Clayton Act. Section I.B traces the common law origins and development of the fraudulent concealment doctrine, discussing the key Supreme Court cases applying the doctrine over the past 120 years. Section l.C analyzes courts' recent application of the fraudulent concealment doctrine to section 4B actions. In particular, this section sets out three different standards that courts have used for the concealment requirement and discusses the confusion among the courts in choosing among these standards. This Part concludes that the current application of the fraudulent concealment standard in section 4B cases creates uncertainty and confusion in the courts, thereby defeating the underlying goal of section 4B.
A. Section 4B of the Clayton Act
Prior to 1955, the Clayton Act did not include a statute of limitation, and federal courts relied on state law to determine limitation periods for private antitrust actions brought under the Clayton Act. 7 [Vol. 91:2259
B. The Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine
Even without any basis in statutory language, courts have long been willing to toll statutes of limitation. The doctrine of fraudulent concealment has its roots in the much-cited case of Bailey v. Glover. 15 In Bailey, an assignee in bankruptcy filed a bill to set aside certain conveyances to Glover's relatives. 16 The applicable statute of limitation under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 17 provided that the assignee could not bring any action more than two years after the cause of action accrued. The Supreme Court tolled the statute of limitation because the defendant's concealment of the fraudulent conveyance prevented the plaintiff from discovering the injury creating the cause of action. 18 The Court stated:
when there has been no negligence or !aches on the part of a plaintiff in coming to the knowledge of the fraud which is the foundation of the suit, and when the fraud has been concealed, or is of such character as to conceal itself, the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered by, or becomes known to, the party suing .... 19 Courts have relied on this statement as the basis for the modem fraudulent concealment doctrine. 20 While the fraudulent concealment doctrine has grown in importance since Bailey, neither the Supreme Court nor commentators have given it extensive attention. 21 In 1921, the Supreme Court extended the Bailey doctrine beyond the Bankruptcy Code. In Exploration Co. v fraudulent concealment doctrine tolled the statutory limitation. 24 Although the statute did not expressly provide for tolling, the Bailey doctrine was well settled at the time the statute was enacted, and the Court thus presumed it was part of the statute. 25 Although the Supreme Court explicitly expanded the Bailey doctrine beyond the Bankruptcy Act in Exploration Co., the Court failed to define the scope of the doctrine. 26 Twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in Holmberg v. Armbrecht. 27 Armbrecht involved a suit in equity to enforce the Federal Farm Loan Act 28 against the shareholders of a joint stock land bank. The Court, without dissent, 29 tolled the relevant limitation period and stated in dictum that the fraudulent concealment doctrine "is read into every federal statute of limitation." 30 In the forty-seven years since Armbrecht, the Court has left it to the lower courts to determine how to read the doctrine into section 4B of the Clayton Act.
C. Fraudulent Concealment Applied to Section 4B of the Clayton Act
Despite the language in Armbrecht, defendants in early section 4B cases often contested the application of the fraudulent concealment doctrine to the Clayton Act. 31 Although several district courts refused to apply the doctrine at first, 32 it is now well settled that courts may use the fraudulent concealment doctrine to toll the Clayton Act's 24. Exploration Co., 247 U.S. at 449; see also Marcus, supra note 21, at 840 (noting that the Supreme Court "had no trouble" applying the fraudulent concealment doctrine).
25 33 In order to toll section 4B, a plaintiff must plead and prove the three elements common to all fraudulent concealment claims. 34 , However, courts disagree as to what actions satisfy the requirement that defendants "conceal" the conduct constituting the cause of action. 35 In considering the concealment element, courts have identified two types of concealment: (a) concealment by affirmative acts; and (b) self-concealment. 36 vided an example to illustrate the difference between these two means of concealment: The theft of an antique vase from its owner's house contains no element of concealment; the thief does not conceal the crime even though the thief is likely to attempt to conceal his involvement in the crime. If the thief steals the antique vase and replaces it with a worthless copy, the thief has taken an affirmative act to conceal the fact that a crime was committed. The wrong is the theft of the vase; the replacement is an act of concealment that is separate from the crime itself since it is not a necessary element of the wrong. On the other hand, if the thief sells an imitation antique vase as a real vase, the thief commits a self-concealing wrong. The thief in this case does not intend merely to hide the wrong; rather, concealment is an essential element of the wrong -without it there can be no crime. 37 In Bailey v. Glover, the Supreme Court held that either concealment by affirmative acts or self-concealment could toll the statute of limitation. 38 However, because Bailey involved an underlying action for fraud, some courts have hesitated to apply the holding in the nonfraud context of the antitrust laws. As a result, federal courts have applied three different standards 39 to satisfy the concealment element of the fraudulent concealment doctrine: (1) the separate-and-apart standard; 40 (2) the self-concealment standard; 41 and (3) the affirmative acts standard. 42 Illegal bid rigging, a violation of the federal antitrust laws' prohibition on price fixing, provides a good example of how the three standards differ. Bid rigging can arise when one party, often a state or local agency, solicits competitive bids for a project. 43 Absent a bidrigging scheme, each potential supplier interested in.the job will independently submit a bid based on the supplier's expected costs and profit margin. If number of bids, it then can choose the best offer, secure that it has received a competitive price.
When suppliers form a bid-rigging conspiracy, however, they do not submit competitive bids. Rather, the potential bidders predetermine which supplier will win the bid. 44 The "winner" submits an inflated bid, and the "losers" submit complementary bids that are higher than the winning bid. In addition, all bidders may have to submit affidavits stating that they did not collude when determining bids. The complementary bids and the noncollusion affidavits give the bidding the appearance of a regular, competitive bidding process. In a successful scheme, the appearance of regularity conceals the antitrust violation from the party seeking the bid. Whether a court will toll section 4B because of this concealment depends largely on what concealment standard the court applies.
The Separate-and-Apart Standard
Courts that follow the separate-and-apart standard require the plaintiff to show that the defendant concealed the antitrust violation through affirmative acts committed wholly apart from the underlying illegal activity. 45 To date, only the Tenth Circuit has adopted this standard. 46 In Colorado v. Western Paving Construction Co., the State of Colorado filed a civil suit alleging that the defendant conspired to rig bids on state highway projects. 47 Because the alleged antitrust violations occurred thirteen years before the state filed suit, the state argued that the fraudulent concealment doctrine should toll the section 4B statute of limitation. 48 The state argued that the defendant concealed the wrong by submitting a false affidavit denying its involvement in collusive activities; the defendant had submitted a complementary bid to give the bidding an appearance of regularity and maintained a secret list of competitors in the conspiracy. 49 In considering whether the defendant's actions met the concealment requirement, the district court analyzed the history of the fraudulent concealment doctrine beginning with Bailey v. Glover. The court interpreted Bailey as providing two different fraudulent concealment 44 . The conspirators can select the "winner" formally or informally. For example, in the electrical manufacturers' bid·rigging conspiracies prosecuted in the early 1960s, the conspirators rotated winners based on a predetermined division of the market among the competitors. See Note, Admissibility of Guilty Pleas, supra note 43, at 692 n.44.
In a less formal arrangement, one bidder may ask competitors to allow him to win a given bid in exchange for the promise to do likewise in the future. tests: one when the underlying cause of action was grounded in fraud and a separate test when the action was not grounded in fraud. 50 In actions based on fraud, the plaintiff must prove either that the plaintiff exercised due diligence in an attempt to discover the crime or that the defendant concealed the wrong. 51 Thus, if the plaintiff can prove due diligence, there is absolutely no concealment requirement. On the other hand, the district court held that in actions that are not grounded in fraud, including antitrust actions, the plaintiff must prove both due diligence and "affirmative acts of concealment." 52 Consequently, where there is a concealment requirement in nonfraud cases, the plaintiff only can meet it under this standard by showing affirmative acts of concealment, not by showing that the defendant's actions were by their nature self-concealing. Applying the affirmative acts requirement to the facts of the case, the district court in Western Paving held that the defendant's acts did not constitute concealment. 53 The submission of complementary bids and the maintenance of confidential bid lists did not toll the statute of limitation because they were "acts taken in carrying out the conspiracy itself." 54 Therefore, the court found that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proving affirmative acts separate-and-apart from the underlying wrong. 55 Holding that bid-rigging schemes are per se self-concealing, a Tenth Circuit panel overturned the district court. 56 However, upon rehearing, the Tenth Circuit sitting en bane vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the district court. 57 also argued that the defendant affirmatively concealed the antitrust violation by submitting a false affidavit denying involvement in collusive activities. The court held that the plaintiff did not prove that it could impute the actions of the individual submitting the affidavit to the defendant corporation. However, the court went on to say that even if it had imputed the action to the defendant, the submission of such an affidavit would not have been an affirmative act of concealment under the separate-and-apart test. 630 F. Supp. at 209-10.
55. The court noted that the facts of Western Paving highlighted the importance of the separate-and-apart standard since it was "a classic case in which the statute of limitations should be given effect" because the facts were so stale and much evidence had been lost. 59 The court considered the self-concealment standard appropriate because the submission of false bids as real bids was analogous to the selling of a sham vase as a genuine antique vase. 60 Turning to the facts of the case, the court held that, because "the defendants' scheme necessarily included concealment of the existence of their conspiracy, proof of the conspiracy itself sufficed to prove concealment by the coconspirators." 61 Thus, in determining that the defendant "concealed" the antitrust violation, the court did not find it necessary to identify specific acts of concealment; rather, the court held that the wrong, by its nature, concealed itself. 62
The Affirmative Acts Standard
Like the separate-and-apart standard, the affirmative acts standard requires that the plaintiff show affirmative acts of concealment. 63 Under the affirmative acts standard, however, these acts of concealment may include acts committed as part of the conspiracy. Texas v. Allan Construction Co., 64 another highway construction bid-rigging case, highlights the difference between the two standards. In Allan Construction, the state attempted to toll the section 4B limitation period because the defendants submitted false competitive bids and false affidavits claiming that their bids were valid. The state argued that these actions constituted inherently self-concealing acts, or, in the alternative, were affirmative acts of concealment. furtherance of the conspiracy. 6s On appeal, the Fifth Circuit first rejected the application of the self-concealment standard as inconsistent with Congress' intent in enacting the Clayton Act's four.:.year statute of limitation. 66 In doing so, however, the court did not explicitly reject the self-concealment standard for all section 4B cases; rather, it limited its discussion to bid rigging.
The court then considered whether the defendants' actions represented affirmative acts of concealment. The Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the Western Paving separate-and-apart approach and held that acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy also could constitute acts of concealment that toll the statute of limitation. 67 Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the court held that the submission of affidavits of denial could constitute affirmative acts of concealment. 68
The court rejected the Western Paving test based on the underlying goal of the fraudulent concealment doctrine -to deny wrongdoers who have concealed their conduct the benefit of statutes of limitation. 69 Therefore, " [t] he fact that such concealment occurs at the time of the wrong itself rather than afterwards does not make the wrongdoer any more deserving of the statute's protection." 70 Moreover, from an administrative point of view, the court saw no principled way to determine what acts were independent of the underlying wrong. 71 The Sixth Circuit adopted the affirmative acts standard in Pinney Dock & Transportation Co. v. Pennsylvania Central Corp. 72 In Pinney Dock, the district court tolled the statute of limitation when it found that the defendant committed a self-concealing wrong. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that since "the underlying cause of action here is based upon alleged antitrust violations not fraud . . . a plaintiff should be required to prove affirmative acts of concealment, particularly in light of the strong policy in favor of statutes of limitations."73 Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit unequivocally rejected the application of the self-concealment standard in all antitrust actions, limiting it to actions grounded in fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.
Thus, in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, plaintiffs can meet the concealment requirement by proving affirmative acts of concealment even if the defendant undertakes those acts in furtherance of the antitrust 65 violation. In the Tenth Circuit, plaintiffs must prove affirmative acts of concealment that are separate and apart from the underlying violation. Finally, in the Second Circuit, plaintiffs may prove either affirmative acts of concealment or that the defendant's wrong was inherently self-concealing.
These different standards have produced confusion and inconsistent results for similar claims. In Western Paving, the district court stated that affidavits of denial would not satisfy the concealment element of the fraudulent concealment doctrine. 74 In contrast, virtually identical conduct satisfied the concealment requirement in Allan Construction, in which the court allowed tolling for acts committed as part of the underlying wrong. 75 Finally, in Hendrickson Bros., the court did not find it necessary to discuss any specific acts that the defendant committed and held that the inherently self-concealing nature of the conspiracy served to toll section 4B. 76 Thus, although section 4B would appear to provide a uniform four-year limitation period to all antitrust violations, the effective statute of limitation varies greatly. This result directly undermines Congress' explicit goals in adopting section 4B -to create uniformity and certainty and to discourage forum shopping. 77 The courts can eliminate this confusion and inconsistency by adopting a single concealment standard for all section 4B actions. Part II of this Note concludes that only the self-concealment standard is consistent with fraudulent concealment jurisprudence and with Congress' intent in enacting section 4B.
II. SELF-CONCEALMENT AND THE FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT DOCTRINE
To promote uniformity and certainty, courts should adopt a uniform standard for all section 4B fraudulent concealment cases. This Part argues that the self-concealment standard is an integral part of the fraudulent concealment doctrine, which Congress implicitly included in section 4B. Section II.A examines the judicial creation and expansion of the fraudulent concealment doctrine and argues that the 82 In applying the Bailey doctrine, though, many courts have split Bailey in half; they apply the fraudulent concealment aspect of Bailey to section 4B but limit the self-concealment aspect to actions grounded in fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. 83 Neither Bailey nor Armbrecht, however, provides an adequate basis for this distinction.
Nothing in Bailey or Armbrecht implies that only the affirmative acts standard applies to nonfraud cases. Bailey in no way suggests any limitation on the scope of the self-concealment element; rather, Bailey treats the self-concealment and the affirmative acts aspects identically. 84 A court should limit the application of the Bailey doctrineby excluding the self-concealment standard -only if Armbrecht expanded one half of the Bailey doctrine. The language of Armbrecht, however, directly contradicts such an interpretation. Armbrecht expands "[t]his equitable doctrine," which it had set forth in the preceding sentence:
And so this Court long ago adopted as its own the old chancery rule that where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and "remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of any committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party. " 85 This sentence discusses the entire Bailey doctrine, including the absence of an affirmative acts requirement. The next sentence 86 mandates that courts read the entire doctrine into every federal statute of limitation, including section 4B. 87 To limit the application of the selfconcealment standard to actions grounded in fraud lacks support in Supreme Court precedent; Armbrecht explicitly recognized its origin Note in fraud yet unequivocally extended it to all federal statutes of limitation.
Some commentators and courts have argued, however, that this dictum in a forty-seven-year-old case does not justify the expansion of the self-concealment standard to section 4B. 8 8 Nevertheless, for thirty years, courts have relied on this Supreme Court dictum in applying the fraudulent concealment doctrine to antitrust actions. 89 As one court noted in applying the Armbrecht dictum to section 4B, "we must recognize the clear, direct, explicit, and unqualified statement of the Supreme Court."90
Courts have also recognized the relationship between fraudulent concealment and the self-concealment standard outside the antitrust context. Cases arising under RIC0 91 provide a particularly apt analogy to the Clayton Act. Because Congress enacted RICO without a statute of limitation, the Supreme Court has held that the section 4B four-year limitation applies to civil RICO claims. 92 The Court has thus applied the antitrust time limitation because the Clayton Act offered the closest analogy to RIC0. 93 In 1989, the District of Columbia Circuit considered the relationship between the fraudulent concealment doctrine and the RICO fouryear limitation period. Both RICO and the Clayton Act are designed to remedy economic injury by providing for the recovery of treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees. Both statutes bring to bear the pressure of "private attorneys general" on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate; the mechanism chosen to reach the objective in both the Clayton Act and RICO is the carrot of treble damages. Moreover, both statutes aim to compensate the same type of injury; each requires that a plaintiff show injury "in his business or property by reason of" a violation. [Vol. 91:2259 held that the plaintiff could meet the concealment requirement by showing either affirmative acts of concealment or self-concealment. Moreover, every federal court that has considered the issue has applied the self-concealment standard to the RICO statute of limitation. 95 In tolling the RICO limitation period, the courts have refused to do what several courts have done in the section 4B context: split the Bailey doctrine in two. The RICO courts' application of the Bailey doctrine properly follows the Supreme Court's language in Bailey, which set out the entire doctrine, and the language of Armbrecht, which expanded the entire doctrine, including the self-concealment standard, to all federal statutes of limitation.
B. Legislative Intent
The legislative history of the Clayton Act suggests Congress intended to incorporate the fraudulent concealment doctrine, along with the self-concealment standard, into the section 4B statute of limitation. During congressional debate over section 4B, the following discussion occurred on the House floor between Representative Patman and R~presentative Celler, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and floor manager of the bill: This exchange suggests that, despite the absolute language of section 4B, Congress did not intend to create an absolute limitation period. However This discussion demonstrates that Congressmen Celler and Patman equated "change" with any provision that did not allow tolling in cases of conspiracy or fraud. Therefore, it must have been clear to Congress that the then-existing law provided such a tolling mechanism, which Congress did not intend to alter. 101 Opponents of applying the Bailey doctrine to section 4B discount these discussions as mere colloquy between two members of Congress who wanted to allow diligent plaintiffs to toll section 4B until they discovered the antitrust violation; as such, the discussions would deserve little weight in construing the statute. 102 However, while a colloquy does not always serve as an accurate indicator of congressional intent, 103 102. See Atlantic City Elec. Co., 312 F.2d at 243 (Moore, J., dissenting) ("To say that a colloquy of two Congressmen known to be advocates of the rejected amendment establishes the intent of Congress is an unwarranted speculation .... "); Case Note, Antitrust, supra note 81, at 820 (criticizing the "questionable use of the eleventh-hour colloquy on the floor of the House as a device for construing legislative intent"); Recent Cases, Antitrust, supra note 78, at 1217-18 ("Celler's statement should be given little, if any, weight to show an affirmative congressional intent that the Bailey doctrine be applied to section 4B.").
103. 2A SINGER, supra note 98, at § 48.13.
[Vol. 91:2259 a bill's sponsor or a member of the committee that considered the bill.104 Opponents also discount these conversations because, in the six years prior to enacting section 4B, Congress considered and rejected several proposals that would have tolled the time period until discovery, 105 and Congress rejected Representative Patman's attempts to add a discovery provision to section 4B in 1955. 106 However, the following colloquy suggests that Congress never intended to eliminate tolling for conspiracy cases and had rejected the "discovery" provision because it was overinclusive: As Chairman Celler emphasized, a general discovery provision differs from a fraudulent concealment provision. Under discovery provisions, plaintiffs can toll the statute of limitation until discovery by proving merely that they exercised due diligence.1os Under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, in contrast, a plaintiff also must prove that the defendant concealed the acts giving rise to the cause of action, either through affirmative concealment or by committing a wrong that inherently conceals itself. 109 For example, a single firm's attempt to monopolize would not be a conspiracy, self-concealing or otherwise, that would trigger the fraudulent concealment doctrine in the absence of affirmative concealment. Such conduct would toll the cause of action under a discovery provision, however. Consequently, Congress' rejection of a discovery provision does not represent a rejection of the fraudulent concea1ment doctrine or the self-concea1ment standard. 110 The legislative history of section 4B provides some support for including the self-concea1ment standard in the fraudulent concea1ment doctrine as applied to section 4B. Although Congress did not expressly include a tolling mechanism, it implicitly incorporated the fraudulent concea1ment doctrine with the self-concea1ment standard into section 4B. In doing so, Congress acted consistently with Supreme Court jurisprudence, which has never separated the self-concealment standard from the fraudulent concea1ment doctrine. Therefore, courts should apply the self-concea1ment standard to section 4B cases because it is most consistent with Congress' intent in passing section 4B and with the Supreme Court's treatment of the fraudulent concealment doctrine.
III. THE BEST STANDARD
An appropriate concea1ment standard should not only be consistent with congressional intent and current jurisprudence, but also should help achieve the policy goals of the underlying statute. This Part considers how each of the three standards for the concealment element -separate-and-apart, affirmative acts, and self-concealment -meetS these objectives. Section III.A reviews the general policies behind statutes of limitation and argues that the self-concea1ment standard best furthers these policies. This section also responds to the criticism that mere silence would be sufficient to toll the limitation period under a self-concea1ment standard. Section III.B examines the specific goals of section 4B -to create uniformity and certainty -and finds that the self-concealment standard best meets these goals. , supra note 105, at 300 ("[A]t least on a conceptual level, the discovery provision may be regarded as sufficiently distinct from the doctrine of fraudulent concealment to say that the rejection of this provision was not a rejection of the applicability of fraudulent concealment."); Recent Cases, Antitrust, supra note 78, at 1217:
To the business interests represented in Congress, the Bailey doctri~e, placing upon a plaintiff the onerous burden of adducing proof of a self-concealing conspiracy or of affirmative acts of concealment in order to toll the statute of limitations, was less objectionable than a bill which did not clearly require proof of affirmative acts of concealment. Cf. Note, Tolling by Fraudulent Concealment, supra note 7, at 607-08 (highlighting the theoretical difference between fraudulent concealment and a discovery provision, but arguing that there is "little practical significance"); id. at 609 (acknowledging that even if there is no actual difference, Congress may have perceived one).
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A. Policies Behind Statutes of Limitation
At first glance, statutes of limitation may seem unfair: they deny a potential plaintiff the right to sue without any consideration of the merits of the claim. lll Nonetheless, "[s]tatutes of limitation form a part of the legislation of every government, and are necessary to the peace and repose of society." 112 Legislatures enact statutes of limitation in part to protect defendants from a plaintifrs fraudulent claims; the passage of time makes it difficult to distinguish between valid and invalid claims. 113 As time progresses, evidence vanishes, memories fade, and witnesses disappear, impairing the accuracy of factfinding. 114 In short, statutes of limitation provide defendants with repose and protection against false claims.
The policies in favor of protecting defendants must be balanced against plaintiffs' interest in obtaining judicial relief. 115 With this balance in mind, legislatures select an appropriate time limit for a given statute. 116 No matter how carefully legislatures balance these competing interests, any statute of limitation necessarily will cut off some legitimate claims of honest plaintiffs and, at the same time, will allow some fraudulent claims to the detriment of innocent defendants. 117 In order to minimize these inequities, courts toll statutes of limitation under specific circumstances. Courts have developed several equitable tolling doctrines to account for situations where plaintiffs' rights to pursue meritorious claims outweigh defendants' rights to protection from stale claims. 118 Tolling doctrines exist solely to complement limitation periods. There is no independent basis for evaluating tolling standards; rather, courts must consider standards in light of the underlying goals of statutes of limitation.
The Supreme Court developed the doctrine of fraudulent conceal- ment as a ground for tolling statutes of limitation in order to prevent defendants from fraudulently gaining protection from a statute oflimitation.119 Moreover, where the defendant's concealment of the wrong has prevented the plaintiff from discovering it, the plaintiff has not sat on his rights, and the court should therefore not prevent him from pursuing meritorious claims.
In choosing a concealment standard, courts should consider the same objectives that justify the judicially created fraudulent concealment doctrine. Because the self-concealment standard is the broadest of the three standards, it will preclude the fewest honest claims by meritorious plaintiffs. 120 A plaintiff who has not discovered a self-concealed wrong is equally deserving of judicial relief as one who has not discovered an affirmatively concealed wrong. 1 21
A stricter concealment standard thus is appropriate only if plaintiffs' interests outweigh the other half of the balance -the defendants' need for protection from false claims supported by stale evidence. It is true that the self-concealment standard will expose defendants to more dishonest claims. However, as noted in Bailey, if the defendant conceals his wrong he does not merit protection from these claims. 122 A defendant who commits a self-concealing wrong deserves no more protection from stale claims than a defendant who actively conceals a wrong. 123 Any standard other than the self-concealment standard 119. Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349 (1875); see also Gius v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232 (1959) ("To decide this case we need look no further than the maxim that no man may take advantage of his own wrong."); Marcus, supra note 21, at 872 ("It is inequitable to allow a defendant who has concealed his wrong to profit from his concealment.").
120. Under the self-concealment standard, the plaintiff can prove either that the defendant concealed the cause of action or that the defendant's conduct concealed itself. Thus, any cause of action that can be tolled under either of the other standards necessarily can be tolled under the self-concealment standard.
121. Cf Marcus, supra note 21, at 866 ("It is certainly odd that the victim of a nationwide price-fixing conspiracy that is inherently self-concealing must prove affirmative concealment to justify his delay in suing when a plaintiff alleging securities fraud against a defendant with whom he dealt personally is relieved of that burden.").
122. See 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 349. This is the rationale underlying the entire fraudulent concealment doctrine.
123. See Horton, supra note 15, at 799-800 ("Defendants who engage in widespread conspiracies often do not have to destroy evidence, falsify documents, or utilize other techniques that would constitute affirmative acts of concealment in order to avoid detection of the conspiracy.").
The defendant's need for protection will be the same in either case because the evidence needed to prove the underlying violation will be equally stale for a self-concealing violation as it will be for a violation concealed after the fact. Arguably, the choice of a standard will affect the age of the evidence required to prove the concealment. Under the self-concealing and affirmative acts standards, the evidence of concealment will be as old as the underlying violation; under the separate-and-apart standard, the concealing act necessarily occurred after the underlying violation. However, this problem is trivial because, in most cases, the separate concealing act occurs only shortly after the conspiracy. would provide different protectfon based on the type of concealment. For example, the affirmative acts standard rewards defendants for engineering wrongs that successfully conceal themselves instead of ones requiring affirmative concealment. 124 The policies behind statutes of limitation do not support such a distinction.
Opponents of the self-concealment standard argue that the standard will render the statute of limitation useless because a plaintiff can toll the time limitation by showing that the defendant remained silent or merely denied involvement in the scheme. 125 This criticism demonstrates the existence of some common misconceptions about the selfconcealment standard. First, adopting a self-concealment standard is not equivalent to adopting a discovery provision. Under the self-concealment standard, courts will toll undiscovered antitrust causes of action only if the defendant commits affirmative acts of concealment or if concealment represents a necessary part of the wrong. For example, if a plaintiff claims that the defendant violated the Sherman Act by attempting to monopolize, the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendant committed an inherently self-concealing wrong; therefore, such a plaintiff must prove affirmative acts of concealment to toll section 4B. A concealment standard should not only further the general policies behind statutes of limitation, but also the specific policies of section 4B. In enacting section 4B Congress intended to eliminate confusion, improve fairness, and reduce forum shopping by creating a uniform statute of limitation. 132 Choosing and applying a uniform standard will help achieve these objectives. 133 This section examines the three standards and concludes that the self-concealment standard will further these policies, while the affirmative acts standard and the separate-and-apart standard will continue to create uncertainty and confusion.
I. The Affirmative Acts Standard
Under the affirmative acts standard, the plaintiff can meet the concealment requirement by showing that the defendant committed affirmative acts of concealment, even if the defendant did so as part of the underlying violation. 134 While this standard appears simple on its face, it has created confusion as to what conduct satisfies the concealment requirement.
. The Tenth Circuit's opinion in King & King Enterprises v. Champlin Petroleum Corp., 135 a private price-fixing suit, illustrates the confusion created by the standard. The court began its discussion of the concealment requirement by quoting with approval a passage stating that the plaintiff need not show. affirmative acts of concealment if the defendant's actions were inherently self-concealing. 136 However, the Tenth Circuit then noted that the plaintiff must prove "some af- [Vol. 91:2259 firmative act of fraudulent concealment" to meet the concealment requirement. 137 The King & King standard created so much confusion that different courts have cited the case for opposite propositions. 138
Although the King & King court adopted the affirmative acts standard, the court's threshold for affirmative acts was so low as to render the requirement virtually meaningless. The plaintiff in King & King showed that the defendants committed two affirmative acts in concealing their price-fixing conspiracy: (1) they created a phone list with two columns to separate those people in on the conspiracy from those who were not; and (2) they made their price-fixing-related phone calls after regular business hours. Based on this evidence, the court held that as a matter of law the defendants' conduct represented affirmative acts of concealment. 139 Although the court applied the affirmative acts standard, it is hard to imagine any acts within a conspiracy that would not meet this low standard. 140 Such a loose definition of affirmative acts is not unique to the Tenth Circuit. Other courts have found that the submission of a noncollusion affidavit, 141 agreements to give false grand jury testimony, 142 and denial of wrongdoing 143 could constitute affirmative acts of concealment. With such a loose definition of affirmative acts, no defendant could engage in a bid-rigging conspiracy without some "affirmative" act of concealment. Despite the courts' language to the contrary, the affirmative act standard as applied in many cases is virtually indistinguishable from the self-concealment standard. 144 Although these criticisms address specific applications of the affirmative acts standard, they reveal an underlying problem with the standard itself. The standard requires courts to draw a line between affirmative concealment and self-concealment, yet no court has demonstrated an ability to do so in a consistent manner.
The Separate-and-Apart Standard
The separate-and-apart standard avoids this specific line-drawing problem by excluding all acts that are part of the conspiracy . 145 This solution simply changes the nature of the line-drawing problem, however; instead of determining which acts are "affirmative," the court must decide which acts constitute part of the underlying conspiracy. 146
Courts have distinguished acts as separate and apart by determining whether the acts are "in furtherance" of the underlying conspiracy.147 Conspirators, however, necessarily must keep the conspiracy secret to be successful; thus, "every act of concealment furthers the success of the offense by stalling its detection." 148 Consequently, "the standard becomes a subjective judicial judgment that does little to promote certainty." 149
In an alternative approach, judges distinguish acts based not on their role in the scheme, but on whether they occur subsequent in time to the underlying violation. 150 The ongoing nature of the typical antitrust conspiracy renders this distinction inconsequential, however. 151 In addition, this approach will lead to arbitrary results: an act done one day after the end of conspiracy will toll the statute of limitation, while the same act done one day before the conspiracy ends will not.152 concealment suggest that, as a practical matter, the concealment prong is no longer an independent requirement."). 148. Allan Constr., 851 F.2d at 1532 (5th Cir. 1988); Marcus, supra note 21, at 859 (noting that price-fixing conspiracies must be kept secret to be successful); Opel, supra note 33, at 657 ("[I)t is often very hard for a plaintiff to label a defendant's acts of concealment as 'separate and apart' because these acts are often closely intertwined with the conspiracy that constitutes the antitrust violations. To rectify this situation, the courts should adopt a single standard: the self-concealment standard. The self-concealment standard constitutes a vital part of the Supreme Court's fraudulent concealment jurisprudence, and courts err when they apply the fraudulent concealment doctrine without the self-concealment standard. In addition, the self-concealment standard furthers Congress' intentions in passing section 4B and best meets the underlying goals of statutes of limitation. Finally, the self-concealment standard relieves courts from the impossible task of distinguishing between the acts comprising the conspiracy and those intended to prevent its detection. Consequently, courts can apply the standard uniformly and consistently, leading to fair and predictable results.
